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Reusability Is the Real Moat in Space: The Launch Economics Explained, With $RKLB as the Worked Example — and What China’s First Booster Catch Changes
On July 10, 2026, China caught an orbital-class rocket booster in a net at sea for the first time — becoming only the third entity, after SpaceX and Blue Origin, to recover a booster from an orbital launch. It is a good moment to stop staring at the rockets and look at the thing that actually decides who wins in space: the economics of reuse. This guide explains those economics plainly, places every major player on a simple “reuse ladder,” uses Rocket Lab ($RKLB) as a concrete worked example, and hands you a reusable way to read the next launch headline.
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Article map
1. Executive summary
2. Why reuse is the game
3. The economics, in numbers
4. The reuse ladder
5. Where each player sits
6. Worked example: $RKLB
7. China’s booster catch
8. A short history
9. Beyond the booster
10. How to read the numbers
11. A triage you can reuse
12. Investable neighborhood
13. The paradox
14. Risks
15. Bottom line
2. Why reuse is the game
3. The economics, in numbers
4. The reuse ladder
5. Where each player sits
6. Worked example: $RKLB
7. China’s booster catch
8. A short history
9. Beyond the booster
10. How to read the numbers
11. A triage you can reuse
12. Investable neighborhood
13. The paradox
14. Risks
15. Bottom line
Executive summary: the launch race is an economics race, not a rocket race
Space investing is full of spectacular hardware — towering boosters, fireballs, sea landings that look like science fiction. But the hardware is not the moat. The moat is a spreadsheet. The company that can fly the same booster again and again, quickly and cheaply, drives its cost per kilogram toward the floor, wins the launch market on price, and then uses that cheap access to build even bigger businesses on top (satellite broadband, Earth observation, defense). Everything else in the sector is downstream of that one advantage: reusability.
That is why China’s July 10, 2026 milestone matters beyond the headline. For the first time, a Chinese launch vehicle — the state-run Long March 10B — recovered its first stage during an orbital launch, settling into a net carried by a ship at sea. China is now the third entity to recover an orbital-class booster, after SpaceX and Blue Origin. It is a genuine breakthrough, and also a reminder that the entire industry is now racing along the same learning curve SpaceX started climbing in 2015.
This article is not a stock pitch. It is a map. It explains, in plain language, why reuse collapses launch costs; it lays out a “reuse ladder” — the stages a rocket program climbs from throwaway to high-cadence reuse — so you can place any company or country at a glance; it uses Rocket Lab ($RKLB) and its coming Neutron rocket as a concrete worked example of a Western challenger climbing that ladder; and it gives you a simple triage to route the next launch headline to what it actually means. The named players — SpaceX (now public as $SPCX), Blue Origin, China’s CASC, Rocket Lab, and the ecosystem of satellite and data companies that ride cheap launch — are examples inside the framework, not the point of it.
The reader’s takeaway should be a mental model you keep: whenever a launch story breaks, you will be able to ask, calmly, whether it touches cost (reuse), cadence (how often), or payload (who is paying) — and whether it is about your company, a neighbor, or the whole street. That skill is worth far more than any single number below.
Why reuse is the whole game, explained plainly
Imagine an airline that threw away the airplane after every flight. A ticket from New York to London would not cost a few hundred dollars; it would cost the price of a new jet. For sixty years, that is exactly how rockets worked: each launch consumed a vehicle that cost tens of millions of dollars to build, used once, and dropped into the ocean. The rocket was the most expensive disposable object ever made.
Reusability breaks that model. If you can fly the booster back, land it, inspect it, and launch it again, the enormous cost of building the vehicle is spread across many flights instead of one. The marginal cost of a launch stops being “the price of a new rocket” and becomes “the price of fuel, refurbishment and operations” — a small fraction of the whole. Do that dozens of times per booster and the economics do not improve a little; they change category.
Two numbers do the heavy lifting, and both come from the leader of the field, SpaceX. First, the ratio between refurbishing and rebuilding: refurbishing a recovered Falcon 9 first stage is widely reported to cost on the order of a few hundred thousand dollars, against roughly tens of millions of dollars to build a new one — well under a tenth, and by some estimates under one percent, of the build cost. Second, the flight count: SpaceX has now landed orbital-class boosters more than 600 times, and its most-flown booster has flown more than 30 times, against a design target of around 40 flights per vehicle. When one airframe flies dozens of missions, the per-flight share of its build cost becomes almost a rounding error.
The consequence is the collapse in cost per kilogram to orbit — the single most important price in the industry. Expendable rockets historically put a kilogram into low Earth orbit for many thousands of dollars; a reused Falcon 9 has pushed the list price of that same kilogram down into the low thousands, and internal costs are estimated to be a good deal lower still. Those exact figures are estimates and vary by source, so treat them as ranges rather than gospel — but the direction is not in doubt, and the direction is the whole story. Cheaper access to orbit is not a marginal improvement; it is the thing that makes megaconstellations, cheap Earth observation, and a real space economy financially possible.
The one-sentence version: reuse turns a rocket from a disposable product into a piece of capital equipment — and capital equipment that flies 30+ times has a cost structure a throwaway competitor can never match.
The economics, in numbers (with the caveats)
Here are the reference points that anchor the reuse thesis. They come from company disclosures and widely cited industry reporting; where a figure is an estimate, it is labelled as one. The purpose is not false precision — it is to give you orders of magnitude you can carry around.
| Economic lever | Rough figure | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|
| Cost to build a new Falcon 9 first stage | ~tens of millions of dollars (reported ~US$30M order of magnitude) | The sunk cost that reuse spreads across many flights. |
| Cost to refurbish a recovered first stage | ~a few hundred thousand dollars (reported estimates) | A small fraction of building new — the core of the savings. |
| Orbital-class booster landings by SpaceX | 600+ to date | Reuse is now routine, not experimental — an operational moat. |
| Most flights by a single booster | 30+ (design target ~40) | The more flights per airframe, the lower the per-flight cost. |
| Cost per kg to LEO, expendable era | many thousands of US$/kg | The old ceiling that made big constellations uneconomic. |
| Cost per kg to LEO, reused Falcon 9 | low thousands of US$/kg (list); internal estimates lower | The price collapse that unlocked the modern space economy. |
Read the table as a shape, not as a set of exact truths. The exact refurbishment cost, the exact internal cost per kilogram, and the exact savings per reuse are not publicly audited numbers, and different analysts land in different places. What is not in dispute is the ratio: refurbishing is cheap relative to building, and flying an airframe many times drives the per-flight economics down by an order of magnitude. That ratio is the reason one company came to dominate global launch — and the reason everyone else, from Seattle to Beijing, is now trying to copy it.
The reuse ladder: a framework you can place anyone on
Reusability is not a binary — “reusable” or “not.” It is a ladder with distinct rungs, and almost all of the value sits near the top. Learning the rungs lets you place any rocket, company or country at a glance and know what they still have to prove.
Rung 1 — Expendable
The vehicle is used once and discarded. Reliable, simple, and economically obsolete for high-volume work. Most of the world’s heritage rockets live here.
Rung 2 — Recover it (land the booster at all)
The company demonstrates it can bring a first stage back and land it in one piece — on land, on a droneship, or into a net. This is the milestone that makes headlines. It is necessary but not sufficient: a single catch proves the physics, not the business.
Rung 3 — Refly it (launch the same booster again)
Recovering a booster is worthless if you cannot fly it again. Rung 3 is the first actual reuse — turning a recovered stage around and putting it back on the pad. This is where the savings begin to show up.
Rung 4 — Refly it fast and cheaply (short turnaround, low refurbishment)
The economics only work if refurbishment is cheap and turnaround is quick. A booster that takes a year and a fortune to refurbish is barely better than a new one. Rung 4 is where reuse becomes a cost advantage rather than a stunt.
Rung 5 — High cadence at scale (many boosters, many flights, routine)
The top rung: a fleet of boosters each flying many times, launching on a routine schedule, at a marginal cost no expendable rival can touch. Only one company is clearly here today. This rung is the moat.
Keep this ladder handy. Almost every launch headline is really an announcement that some player has reached — or stumbled on — one of these five rungs. The difference between rung 2 (“we caught one”) and rung 5 (“we do this every week”) is the difference between a milestone and a moat.
Where each player sits on the ladder
With the ladder in hand, the current field sorts itself cleanly. Note how much distance separates the top rung from everyone else.
| Player | Vehicle | Rung (mid-2026) | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| SpaceX (public: $SPCX) | Falcon 9 / Falcon Heavy; Starship in test | Rung 5 — high cadence at scale | 600+ landings, 30+ flights on a single booster, routine reuse. The benchmark everyone measures against. |
| Blue Origin | New Glenn | Rung 3 — first reuse achieved | First booster landing Nov 2025; first reflight of a booster April 2026, though that mission’s upper stage failed to place its satellite correctly. Early, not yet routine. |
| China / CASC (state) | Long March 10B | Rung 2 — first recovery | First controlled orbital-class booster recovery on July 10, 2026, via a net-and-ship system; plans to refly the stage by year-end. |
| Rocket Lab ($RKLB) | Neutron (in development); Electron (operational) | Approaching rung 2 with Neutron | Partially reusable medium-lift rocket; first flight targeted for later in 2026. The most investable Western challenger by profile. |
| Chinese commercial (Landspace, CAS Space, others) | Zhuque-3, Kinetica-2, Pallas-1, Nebula 1 | Rung 1–2, developing | Several debuted in late 2025 reaching orbit but not sticking the landing; reuse attempts ongoing. |
The table makes the central fact of the industry visible: SpaceX is two or three full rungs above everyone else. Blue Origin has flown a reused booster; China has caught one; Rocket Lab is about to try. All of that is real progress — and all of it is still one to three rungs below “routine high-cadence reuse.” The gap is not measured in months. It is measured in the hundreds of landings and dozens-of-reflights of operational experience that only one company has.
Worked example: where Rocket Lab ($RKLB) sits, and what it must prove
To see the ladder in action, take one investable Western name and place it precisely: Rocket Lab USA ($RKLB). It is the clearest example of a company climbing from a real, operating small-launch business toward reusable medium-lift — the segment where the economics get interesting.
What Rocket Lab is today
Rocket Lab already runs an operational small launch vehicle, Electron, with dozens of successful flights, and a growing space-systems business (satellites, components, spacecraft). That gives it something most space startups lack: real revenue and a launch track record. But Electron is small; it is not the vehicle that wins the high-volume market.
Where it is climbing to: Neutron
Neutron is Rocket Lab’s medium-lift, partially reusable rocket — the vehicle designed to compete for the constellation-deployment and national-security launches that reuse economics make lucrative. On the ladder above, a successful first Neutron flight would put Rocket Lab on rung 2 (recover) with a line of sight to rung 3 (refly). Industry reporting through late 2025 and 2026 pointed to a first Neutron launch targeted for later in 2026, after earlier slips — a reminder that in this business, schedules move.
What has to be proven (the honest checklist)
- Fly Neutron at all. A successful debut to orbit is the first gate; new rockets routinely slip and sometimes fail on early flights.
- Recover the booster. Demonstrating the landing (rung 2) turns the reuse thesis from a slide into a fact.
- Refly it, then refly it cheaply. Rungs 3 and 4 are where the economics actually arrive — and where SpaceX took years.
- Build cadence and backlog. A rocket that flies twice a year cannot amortize anything; the business needs volume.
That is the worked example: not “buy $RKLB,” but “here is exactly which rung a real company stands on, and precisely what it must do to climb.” Any figures on Rocket Lab’s backlog, cash and timeline should be checked against its own filings and press releases before you rely on them — schedules and balance sheets in this sector change quickly.
The trap to avoid: treating a “reusable rocket company” as if it already had SpaceX’s economics. Owning a spot on rung 2 is not the same as living on rung 5. The distance between them is the investment risk — and the potential reward.
China’s first booster catch, explained — and what it does (and doesn’t) mean
Now place the news that prompted this piece precisely on the ladder. On July 10, 2026, China’s state-owned CASC flew the debut mission of the Long March 10B from the Hainan Commercial Space Launch Site. The two-stage rocket, about 63 metres tall, sent a satellite to orbit; roughly six minutes after stage separation, the first stage returned vertically and was captured in a net-like structure aboard a ship at sea. CASC called it the country’s first successful controlled recovery of a launch vehicle and “the world’s first network-based recovery” — a catch-in-a-net approach rather than the landing legs SpaceX uses. China says it plans to refly the stage by the end of the year.
What it genuinely means
This is a real rung-2 achievement, and it should not be minimised. Recovering an orbital-class booster is hard; only SpaceX and Blue Origin had done it before. It proves China can do the physics, it validates a distinctive sea-based net recovery method, and it signals serious national intent to build cheap, high-cadence access to orbit — with several more Chinese reusable vehicles (state and commercial) in development behind it.
The nuance that makes it worth thinking about
Here is the part that separates a headline reader from an analyst. First, this is a state program (CASC), not a Chinese commercial startup — so it is best read as national capability, not as a listed-company catalyst. Second, catching one booster is rung 2; SpaceX lives on rung 5. Between them lie the reflight, the cheap-and-fast reflight, and the hundreds of landings that turn a stunt into a cost structure. China has announced the intent to refly by year-end; doing it, then doing it routinely, is a multi-year climb — the same climb SpaceX took roughly a decade to complete after its own first landing in December 2015.
The right framing: China just stepped onto the bottom of the reuse ladder that SpaceX has been standing on top of for years. That is important for the geopolitics of space and for the long-run competitive map — but it does not, by itself, change any single Western company’s next quarter.
A short history of the climb: SpaceX 2015 to today
It is worth recalling how long and non-linear the leader’s climb was, because it puts every newcomer in perspective. In December 2015 SpaceX landed a Falcon 9 first stage on land for the first time; a few months later, in 2016, it managed its first droneship landing at sea. But more than a year passed between the first landing (rung 2) and the first actual reflight of a booster (rung 3): the first reuse came in 2017. And it took several more years of work on reliability, refurbishment and turnaround times for reuse to become cheap and then routine (rungs 4 and 5).
Along the way there were explosions, missed landings and public setbacks. The point is not that the climb was easy — it was not — but that each rung required repeated demonstration, not a single success. That is exactly the yardstick by which Blue Origin, China and Rocket Lab should be judged today: not “did they reach a rung once?” but “can they do it repeatably, cheaply and often?” SpaceX’s history suggests the distance between a first success and routine economics is measured in years, not quarters.
Lesson from the history: applaud anyone’s first landing, but keep score on the reflights. Repeatability, not the debut, is what builds the moat.
Beyond the booster: where the rest of the cost hides
The first-stage booster is the single biggest cost of a rocket, but it is not the only one. On a Falcon 9, the second stage is still expendable — thrown away on every flight — while the fairings (the two halves of the nose cone that protect the payload) are recovered and reused by SpaceX. So even the “reusable” Falcon 9 discards part of itself each time it flies. That is why the real frontier is full reusability: a vehicle where both stages come back. Starship is SpaceX’s bet on exactly that, and it is why the program matters far beyond its size.
The practical implication is simple. When you hear “fully reusable” — Starship, and the long-term goal of several programs — treat it as a bigger deal than “booster reuse.” Recovering the booster captured most, but not all, of the cost; recovering the second stage too is the next order-of-magnitude step, and by far the hardest. It also means comparing programs requires asking more than “do they land the booster?” The sharper questions are: what happens to the upper stage, and what happens to the fairings?
The quick check: “booster reuse” is progress on the first stage; “full reuse” (both stages) is a different game entirely. Most of the industry — including China’s Long March 10B — is still working on the first stage.
How to read a launch company’s numbers
Beyond the ladder and the triage, here is a compact checklist you can run on any launch name to judge how close it really is to reuse economics. Think of it as the reader’s tool: six questions that separate a genuine reuse story from a company that has landed one booster and has everything still to prove.
- Flight rate / cadence: how many launches per year, and is the number rising? Cadence is what turns the capability to reuse into actual savings.
- Fleet and flights per booster: how many boosters are in the fleet, and how many times has the most-flown one flown? Reuse depth is what amortizes the build cost.
- Refurbishment cost and turnaround: cheap and fast, or slow and expensive? This is rung 4 — the difference between a cost advantage and a stunt.
- Second-stage and fairing strategy: a fully expendable upper stage caps the savings; recovery and reuse plans for the rest of the vehicle matter.
- Backlog / manifest: how many launches are signed and waiting? Demand visibility is what justifies building cadence in the first place.
- Downstream business: does the company also own a recurring-revenue business (a Starlink-style constellation) that cheap launch feeds? That is often where the biggest long-run value accrues.
Run any launch name through these six questions and the picture usually clarifies quickly. A company with rising cadence, deep reuse, cheap turnaround, a real backlog and a downstream business is a different animal from one with a single successful landing and a slide deck. As always, pull the actual figures from filings and press releases before relying on them — in this sector the numbers move.
Apply the list to the names on this map and the differences jump out: $SPCX embodies high cadence, deep reuse and a huge downstream business (Starlink); $RKLB has a real backlog and space-systems business but still has to carry Neutron onto the reuse rungs; downstream names like $RDW, $ASTS and $LUNR do not launch at all, yet they gain as launch gets cheaper. Same checklist, very different answers: that is exactly how a framework saves you time and keeps you from reacting to the wrong headline when the next launch news breaks.
The checklist in one line: cadence + reuse depth + cheap turnaround + a real backlog + a downstream business is what separates a launch stock from a launch stunt.
The triage you can reuse on the next launch headline
Once the ladder is clear, most launch news becomes manageable. The skill is to route each headline before deciding what it means. Here is the triage, in two quick steps.
Step one — which lever does it touch?
Ask whether the news is about cost (a reuse or refurbishment milestone — moving up the ladder), cadence (how often a vehicle flies — the difference between a demo and a business), or payload/customer (a contract, a constellation order, a national-security award — who is paying). A “we landed a booster” story is a cost/ladder event; a “we signed a launch contract” story is a payload event; a “we flew twice this week” story is cadence. They mean very different things.
Step two — whose layer is it?
Then ask whether it touches your company, a neighbor, or the whole street. China’s booster catch is a whole-street event: it shifts the industry narrative but is not a specific listed company’s catalyst. A Neutron test would be a company event for Rocket Lab. A SpaceX price cut would be a street event that pressures every rival’s pricing at once.
Run any future launch headline through these two questions — which lever, whose layer — and you will avoid the most common mistake in space investing: reacting to a spectacular video as if it changed the fundamentals of a company it barely touches.
The investable neighborhood (and the players you can’t buy)
Reuse economics do not just affect rocket makers; they ripple through everything that rides cheap launch. Keep this map beside the triage: the triage tells you which lever a headline touches, the map tells you who lives where.
- Launch, benchmark: SpaceX, now public as $SPCX after the largest IPO in history in June 2026. The rung-5 standard against which all launch economics are measured.
- Launch, Western challenger: Rocket Lab ($RKLB) with Neutron — the most investable name climbing toward reusable medium-lift.
- Launch, private/state (context, not investable directly): Blue Origin (New Glenn) and China’s CASC (Long March family) — they shape the competitive map but are not listed equities you can simply buy.
- Payloads and space systems that ride cheap launch: names like $RDW (space infrastructure and components) and the broader satellite-manufacturing world benefit as launch gets cheaper and more frequent.
- Constellations and connectivity: $ASTS (direct-to-device) and other constellation builders depend on affordable, high-cadence launch to deploy fleets at all.
- Lunar and beyond: $LUNR and other cislunar players are downstream of the same cost curve — cheaper launch widens what is economically reachable.
The pattern to notice: cheaper launch is bearish for the pricing power of launch sellers over time, but bullish for the many businesses that buy launch. That tension is the paradox in the next section — and each ticker above deserves its own primary-source homework before you act on it.
The paradox: reuse spreading is bearish for launch prices and bullish for the space economy
Here is the counter-intuitive idea worth sitting with. As reusability spreads from one company to several, and from the US to China, the natural instinct is to read it as pure competition — more suppliers, lower prices, thinner margins for launch providers. And for the launch sellers, that instinct is partly right: a world with several rung-4 and rung-5 operators is a world where launch is a lower-margin commodity than a world with a single dominant provider.
But launch is an input, not the whole economy. Every dollar taken out of the price of reaching orbit is a dollar added to the viability of everything that uses orbit: broadband megaconstellations, cheap and frequent Earth observation, defense and geointelligence, cislunar logistics, even orbital data centers. The cheaper and more routine launch becomes — from whatever flag — the larger the addressable market for the companies that build the satellites, the sensors, the analytics and the services on top. A reusable-rocket world can be simultaneously harder for launch pricing and far bigger for the space economy as a whole.
That is why the same event — China catching a booster, or a new entrant reaching rung 3 — can be read two opposite and both-valid ways depending on which layer you are standing on. For a launch provider defending its pricing, more reuse is a threat. For a satellite or data company buying launch, more reuse is a gift. Sophisticated readers hold both thoughts at once, and ask which layer a given company actually lives on before deciding whether a reuse milestone is good news or bad news for it.
Risks and what must be proven
- Milestones are not moats. A single booster catch (rung 2) is a long way from routine, cheap, high-cadence reuse (rung 5). Most of the economic value lives at the top of the ladder, and only one company is clearly there.
- Schedules slip. New rockets — Neutron, Starship, Chinese reusables — routinely miss target dates and sometimes fail on early flights. Timelines in this sector should be held loosely.
- Reuse is not the same as reliability. Blue Origin reflew a booster in April 2026 but that mission’s upper stage failed to place its satellite correctly; landing the booster and completing the mission are different problems.
- Estimated economics. Refurbishment costs and internal cost-per-kilogram figures are estimates, not audited disclosures; treat specific numbers as ranges.
- Commoditization risk for sellers. If reuse becomes widespread, launch pricing power erodes — good for buyers of launch, harder for pure launch providers.
- Geopolitics and access. State programs (China, others) answer to national priorities, not markets, and export-control and security dynamics can reshape who can sell to whom.
Bottom line
The spectacle of a booster landing is easy to love and easy to misread. The durable lesson is quieter: reusability is the economic engine of the entire launch industry, and the reuse ladder — recover, refly, refly cheaply, fly at scale — is the map that tells you what any milestone actually means. SpaceX ($SPCX) sits alone at the top; Blue Origin has begun to reuse; China, with the Long March 10B, has just caught its first booster; Rocket Lab ($RKLB) is about to try to climb on with Neutron. Each is an example inside the same framework.
China’s July 10 catch is a real achievement and a signal of intent, but on the ladder it is a first step onto a climb that took the leader roughly a decade. Keep the triage — cost, cadence, or payload; your company, a neighbor, or the whole street — and you will be able to read the next launch headline calmly, whether it comes from Texas, Florida, Kent or Hainan. What matters is not who lit the prettiest fire, but who can do it again next week for less. Nothing here is a recommendation to buy or sell any security; it is a framework to help you do your own research.
Sources (primary and quality reporting)
Space.com — China lands rocket during an orbital launch for the first time (Long March 10B, July 10, 2026): https://www.space.com/space-exploration/launches-spacecraft/making-history-china-lands-rocket-during-an-orbital-launch-for-1st-time-ever
CASC (China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation) — post-launch statement on Long March 10B first-stage recovery (via Space.com reporting): https://www.space.com/space-exploration/launches-spacecraft/making-history-china-lands-rocket-during-an-orbital-launch-for-1st-time-ever
Space.com — Blue Origin reuses New Glenn booster for the first time, April 19, 2026 (upper-stage anomaly): https://www.space.com/space-exploration/launches-spacecraft/blue-origin-reuses-new-glenn-rocket-landing-success-1st-time-on-april-19-2026-video
Space.com — SpaceX 600th Falcon booster landing milestone: https://www.space.com/space-exploration/launches-spacecraft/spacex-starlink-17-22-b1097-vsfb-ofisly-600th-falcon-landing
Space.com — SpaceX Falcon 9 booster record 36th flight: https://www.space.com/space-exploration/launches-spacecraft/spacex-falcon-9-rocket-launch-36th-time-new-record
SpaceNews / Rocket Lab — Neutron first launch timeline (delayed to 2026): https://spacenews.com/rocket-lab-delays-first-neutron-launch-to-2026/ · https://rocketlabcorp.com/launch/neutron/
CNBC — SpaceX IPO ($SPCX) debut and Nasdaq-100 inclusion, June–July 2026: https://www.cnbc.com/2026/06/12/spacex-ipo-spcx-live-updates.html · https://www.cnbc.com/2026/07/08/spacex-stock-nasdaq-100-ipo.html
Reusability economics (refurbishment vs build, cost-per-kg estimates) — ARK Invest and industry analyses: https://www.ark-invest.com/newsletters/issue-335
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Disclaimer. This content is provided by Merlintrader for educational and informational purposes only. It is not investment advice, an offer, a solicitation, or a recommendation to buy or sell any security, and it does not take into account any individual’s financial situation or objectives. Figures relating to launch costs, refurbishment and reuse are drawn from company statements and industry reporting believed to be reliable but are estimates that vary by source and are not guaranteed to be accurate or complete. Securities mentioned (including $SPCX, $RKLB, $RDW, $ASTS and $LUNR) involve risk, including the possible loss of principal. Always do your own research and consult a licensed financial professional before making any investment decision. In accordance with U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) guidance, Merlintrader is not a registered investment adviser or broker-dealer.
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