Artiva Biotherapeutics Stock Hub: $ARTV, AlloNK, FDA RMAT and the Phase 3 Rheumatoid Arthritis Path

1. Executive Summary: the ARTV story has moved from an oncology platform bet to a registrational autoimmune thesis

Artiva Biotherapeutics is no longer best understood as a small NK-cell oncology company waiting for another lymphoma poster. Its market identity changed during the first half of 2026. The central asset is still AlloNK, also known as AB-101, but the value-driving indication is now refractory rheumatoid arthritis. That change matters because Artiva has moved beyond an early mechanistic hypothesis and assembled four pieces that rarely arrive together in a small clinical-stage biotechnology company: encouraging early efficacy, a potentially differentiated outpatient safety profile, FDA alignment on a single registrational trial and enough capital to execute the plan without an obvious near-term financing deadline.

The clinical case is built on small and non-randomized datasets, so it remains far from proven. In the company-sponsored Phase 2a basket trial, five of seven refractory RA patients with six months of follow-up achieved an ACR50 response. In the investigator-initiated trial, five of six patients achieved ACR50 or modified ACR50 at the same broad follow-up window. Across the pooled 21-patient RA dataset available at the April 3, 2026 cut-off, responses appeared as early as three months, deepened at six months and had not been lost by the cut-off. Artiva also reported complete B-cell depletion in all 28 evaluated RA patients and a broader 55-patient autoimmune safety dataset without cytokine release syndrome, ICANS, AlloNK-related serious adverse events or treatment discontinuations due to adverse events.

The regulatory development is just as important as the response rate. The FDA aligned with Artiva on a single global randomized Phase 3 study expected to enroll approximately 150 patients who failed at least two distinct classes of biologic or targeted synthetic disease-modifying anti-rheumatic drugs. Patients are expected to be randomized 2:1 to AlloNK plus rituximab or rituximab alone, with ACR50 at six months as the primary efficacy endpoint. Artiva plans to begin the trial in H2 2026, report primary data in H2 2028 and, if the risk-benefit profile is favorable, pursue a potential BLA submission in 2029.

After EULAR 2026, the FDA also granted Regenerative Medicine Advanced Therapy designation to AlloNK plus rituximab in refractory RA. RMAT is meaningful because it can provide earlier and more frequent FDA interaction and other expedited-development benefits. It is not an approval, it does not validate the Phase 3 outcome and it should not be described as a substitute for randomized evidence. Still, when combined with the previously disclosed Fast Track designation and the agreed Phase 3 framework, it materially improves the regulatory architecture around the program.

The balance sheet was transformed in May. Artiva sold 23,871,526 common shares and pre-funded warrants covering 2,170,138 additional shares at an economic price of $11.52 per share, raising approximately $300 million gross and an estimated $280.5 million net. The prospectus showed 48,588,198 common shares immediately after the offering before exercise of the new pre-funded warrants. Including those warrants produces an economic share base of at least 50,758,336 shares before options, restricted stock units and future equity awards. That dilution was substantial, but it replaced an immediate capital question with a multi-year execution runway that management says extends into 2029.

2. Why Artiva matters now: four events reset the company during May and June 2026

The most useful way to understand ARTV is to separate the story into “before May 8” and “after June 8.” Before May 8, Artiva was a small-cap platform company with interesting autoimmune anecdotes, a limited cash runway and a market still anchored to its oncology history. By the end of the EULAR cycle, the company had disclosed an early multi-disease efficacy package, secured FDA agreement on the design of a single registrational RA trial, financed the program, presented the broader dataset to rheumatologists and obtained RMAT designation.

Since the June 23 announcement of participation in the H.C. Wainwright cell-therapy conference, no later official clinical or regulatory announcement materially changes this framework through the July 14, 2026 data cut-off. That makes the current phase less about another immediate data headline and more about operational conversion: can management finalize and launch the Phase 3 trial on schedule, activate the planned global network, manufacture sufficient product and enroll a difficult-to-treat population without allowing the timeline to drift?

3. Company Overview and the South Korea connection: U.S. headquarters, Korean technology roots

Artiva Biotherapeutics is incorporated in Delaware, headquartered in San Diego and listed on Nasdaq. It should not be described as a South Korean company. The more accurate description is a U.S. biotechnology company with unusually deep South Korean technology, manufacturing, licensing and ownership ties.

The relationship begins with GC Cell, formerly Green Cross Cell Corporation. In 2019, Artiva entered into the core option and license agreement that underpins its NK-cell platform. GC Cell granted Artiva an exclusive, royalty-bearing license to specified natural-killer-cell intellectual property and technology for a territory covering the world except Asia, Australia and New Zealand. GC Cell retained the excluded territories, while Artiva obtained the right to research, develop, manufacture and commercialize licensed products in its territory and to sublicense those rights.

Artiva has exercised options on four candidates: AB-101, now branded AlloNK; AB-201; AB-202; and AB-205. The AB-101 agreement includes development milestones of up to $22 million, sales milestones of up to $55 million and tiered royalties that can range from the low-mid to high single digits on annual net sales. A separate core-IP royalty can also apply under specified circumstances. These economics are manageable in a successful product scenario, but they mean the asset is not royalty-free and the relationship must be incorporated into any long-run valuation.

The Korean connection is operational as well as contractual. A master manufacturing agreement allows GC Cell to manufacture product for Artiva’s Phase 1 and Phase 2 programs under individual work orders. Artiva owns the results and data generated under that manufacturing agreement. GC Cell has also provided research services. For early clinical development, this partnership allowed Artiva to access an established cell-therapy ecosystem without building every capability independently from inception.

The relationship also appears directly in the shareholder register. GC Corp, the listed Korean parent of GC Cell, and GC Cell purchased a combined 1,432,291 Artiva shares at $11.52 in the May 2026 offering—approximately $16.5 million of new investment. Following those transactions, GC Corp directly reported 4,391,969 shares and GC Cell reported 1,607,734 shares. The filing identifies GC Corp as a public Korean holding company and GC Cell as its subsidiary.

4. What AlloNK is trying to do: turn an anti-CD20 antibody into a deeper B-cell-depleting regimen

AlloNK is an allogeneic, off-the-shelf, non-genetically modified and cryopreserved natural killer cell therapy. Unlike an autologous CAR-T product, it does not require the collection and individualized engineering of each patient’s own T cells. Artiva’s strategic premise is that a standardized NK-cell product can be stored, shipped and administered on demand, then used to enhance the activity of an antibody already directed against a target on pathogenic B cells.

In refractory rheumatoid arthritis, the antibody is rituximab, which binds CD20 on B cells. Rituximab can deplete circulating B cells by multiple immune mechanisms, including antibody-dependent cellular cytotoxicity. Natural killer cells are important effectors of that mechanism. AlloNK is designed to provide a potent and consistent population of NK cells that can recognize antibody-coated B cells and kill them more completely than the patient’s endogenous immune system might achieve with rituximab alone.

The regimen is not simply “an NK infusion.” Patients receive low-dose cyclophosphamide and fludarabine conditioning before AlloNK and rituximab. In the planned Phase 3 framework, Artiva expects two doses of four billion AlloNK cells on days 6 and 20 after conditioning on days 1 through 3. The conditioning is intended to create a favorable environment for the infused cells, but it is also one of the main commercial and safety questions. Even a low-dose regimen adds complexity, laboratory monitoring, infection risk and operational burden compared with a routine biologic prescription.

Why deep B-cell depletion may matter in autoimmunity

Many autoimmune diseases are driven partly by abnormal B-cell populations, autoantibody production, antigen presentation and persistent immune memory. Conventional B-cell-directed antibodies can be clinically useful, but incomplete depletion may allow pathogenic compartments to survive. Cell therapies are being investigated as a way to achieve a more profound immune reset: remove pathogenic B cells, then allow repopulation with a more naïve or transitional phenotype.

Artiva reported uniform peripheral B-cell depletion by day 13 in all 51 evaluable autoimmune patients treated with cyclophosphamide/fludarabine, AlloNK and rituximab. Using a high-sensitivity assay, complete depletion was observed in all 28 evaluated RA patients. The company also reported that reconstituting B cells were predominantly naïve or transitional, a pattern consistent with—but not definitive proof of—the proposed immune-reset hypothesis.

What could differentiate AlloNK from autologous CAR-T

• Availability: a cryopreserved off-the-shelf product can theoretically avoid individualized manufacturing delays.
• Scalability: one manufacturing platform may supply many patients rather than producing a bespoke batch for each patient.
• Outpatient ambition: the observed absence of CRS and ICANS in the current autoimmune dataset supports a community-compatible development goal.
• Cost structure: standardized manufacturing could eventually be less expensive than autologous CAR-T, although Artiva has not yet demonstrated commercial-scale economics.
• Combination flexibility: the platform is designed to amplify antibody-dependent killing and could potentially pair with different antibodies or target different B-cell-mediated diseases.

5. The EULAR 2026 dataset: encouraging breadth, but the RA sample remains small

Artiva presented five accepted abstracts at EULAR 2026 covering clinical efficacy, deep B-cell depletion and safety across refractory rheumatoid arthritis, Sjögren disease and systemic sclerosis. The breadth matters because it supports the idea that the mechanism may operate across multiple B-cell-driven autoimmune diseases. For valuation, however, RA remains the decisive program because it has the clearest regulatory path and the largest near-term commercial relevance.

Refractory rheumatoid arthritis

The pooled RA analysis included 21 patients with at least 12 weeks of follow-up as of April 3, 2026, including 13 with six months of follow-up. These were difficult-to-treat patients: mean disease duration was 14.8 years, all had high disease activity at baseline and 81% had failed two or more classes of biologic or targeted synthetic DMARDs.

In the company-sponsored Phase 2a basket trial, five of seven patients with six months of follow-up achieved ACR50, a 71% response rate. In the investigator-initiated trial, five of six six-month evaluable patients achieved ACR50 or modified ACR50. Across the broader 21-patient dataset, 19 patients demonstrated clinically meaningful improvement in both CDAI and DAS28-ESR. Mean six-month improvements were 37 points for CDAI and 2.8 points for DAS28-ESR.

The durability language was favorable within the available window. By the data cut-off, no patient had lost response, required high-dose steroids or started a new biologic or targeted synthetic DMARD after treatment. That does not establish long-term remission. It means the early clinical signal had not obviously faded within the limited observation period.

Sjögren disease

The Sjögren dataset was smaller and exploratory. In the broader group, patients entered with substantial disease burden. Artiva reported improvement in clinical and patient-reported measures and an increase in mean stimulated salivary flow from 0.65 mL/min at baseline to 1.23 mL/min at six months. Salivary flow is an intuitively important functional measure in Sjögren disease, but the cohort is too small to establish efficacy or define the magnitude of a treatment effect.

Systemic sclerosis

Among systemic-sclerosis patients with six months of follow-up, Artiva reported a mean 9.5-point improvement in modified Rodnan skin score. All achieved rCRISS25 and half achieved rCRISS50. Again, these results are hypothesis-generating rather than registrational. They increase platform optionality but should not be valued as independent late-stage assets.

Safety across 55 autoimmune patients

The broader safety dataset is one of the strongest parts of the current case. As of the cut-off, Artiva reported no cytokine release syndrome, no ICANS, no AlloNK-related serious adverse events and no discontinuations because of adverse events. Grade 3 or higher infections occurred in 2% of patients. No patient was hospitalized for infection during the first 28 days after treatment. Two patients were hospitalized for other treatment-emergent events during that period, and neither hospitalization was considered related to AlloNK.

This profile supports the outpatient development thesis, but the comparison must remain disciplined. Fifty-five patients are not enough to exclude uncommon severe toxicities. Phase 3 will expose more patients, more sites and more variability in supportive care. The conditioning drugs and rituximab have known risks, so the commercial safety discussion must cover the entire regimen rather than the AlloNK component in isolation.

6. The Phase 3 registrational strategy: a compact design with an active control

The FDA-aligned design is unusually compact for a company of Artiva’s size. The planned global randomized controlled trial is expected to enroll approximately 150 adults with refractory RA who have shown inadequate response to at least two biologic or targeted synthetic DMARD classes. Patients are expected to be randomized 2:1 to AlloNK plus rituximab or rituximab alone.

The primary endpoint is ACR50 response at six months. Rituximab was selected as the active comparator because it is part of the experimental combination, is approved for RA and has historically produced ACR50 response rates broadly in line with other established therapies. Nonresponders in the rituximab-alone arm are expected to be offered crossover to AlloNK plus rituximab after six months.

Artiva expects to run the study across more than 80 global sites, including approximately 40 sites already active in its autoimmune clinical program. More than 70 autoimmune patients had initiated treatment across ongoing trials by April 30, 2026, and all had been treated in the outpatient setting, with most treated in community rheumatology clinics. That existing footprint may reduce startup risk, although doubling the network and standardizing a cell-therapy workflow across many sites remains a major execution task.

Fast Track and RMAT: helpful tools, not substitutes for evidence

AlloNK plus rituximab has both Fast Track and RMAT designations in refractory RA. RMAT eligibility requires a regenerative medicine therapy intended for a serious condition and preliminary clinical evidence suggesting potential to address unmet need. The designation can provide early and frequent FDA interaction and access to expedited-development features. It does not mean the agency has concluded that AlloNK is safe, effective or approvable.

The most valuable practical consequence may be communication. Cell-therapy development requires alignment on clinical design, chemistry, manufacturing and controls, long-term safety follow-up and commercial-readiness questions. Frequent regulatory interaction can reduce the risk that Artiva reaches the end of Phase 3 with a program that does not meet the agency’s expectations. It cannot remove clinical risk, but it may reduce avoidable regulatory surprise.

The safety database

Artiva expects the Phase 3 study and ongoing autoimmune trials to produce a pooled safety database of more than 250 patients treated with AlloNK plus rituximab, primarily RA patients but also individuals in other autoimmune indications. Based on FDA feedback, the company believes cross-indication safety data may supplement the RA-specific database. This is strategically useful because the present 55-patient safety population is too small to characterize uncommon events.

7. Pipeline beyond refractory RA: optionality is real, but RA deserves most of the value today

Artiva describes AlloNK as a platform across B-cell-driven autoimmune disease. Current clinical evaluation includes refractory RA, Sjögren disease, systemic sclerosis and myositis. Earlier company work also covered systemic lupus erythematosus, lupus nephritis, pemphigus vulgaris and ANCA-associated vasculitis. The exact development priority can change as data and capital allocation evolve, so not every listed disease should be treated as an independently funded late-stage program.

The February 2026 Merlintrader article correctly described Artiva as a platform-style NK company with oncology and autoimmune shots on goal. The May and June developments now require a sharper hierarchy. RA is the asset. The rest of the pipeline is optionality. Treating every indication and licensed candidate as if it were equally mature would overstate the company’s present evidence and understate the capital required to develop the broader platform.

8. Financial position, burn rate and dilution: the cash problem was solved by dramatically expanding the share count

At March 31, 2026, before the large financing, Artiva reported $86.8 million in cash, cash equivalents and investments. The company used $21.0 million of cash in operating activities during Q1 and recorded a $23.5 million quarterly net loss. Under the pre-financing plan, management expected the balance sheet to fund operations into Q2 2027.

The May financing transformed that picture. Artiva sold 23,871,526 common shares and pre-funded warrants for 2,170,138 shares. Common stock was sold at $11.52, while each pre-funded warrant was sold at $11.5199 with a $0.0001 exercise price. The estimated net proceeds were approximately $280.5 million. The prospectus calculated an as-adjusted net tangible book value of approximately $368.4 million, or $7.26 per share, immediately after the transaction using the assumptions described in the filing.

That $368.4 million figure is not a current cash balance and should not be represented as one. It was a pro forma net-tangible-book calculation based on the March 31 balance sheet and offering proceeds. Artiva has continued to spend money on clinical development, manufacturing, headcount and Phase 3 preparation since that date. The next quarterly filing will provide the first clean post-offering cash reconciliation.

Capital structure after the offering

The offering was both a strength and a warning. It was a strength because management financed after a major clinical rerating and attracted high-quality specialist participation. It was a warning because the economic share base more than doubled relative to the March quarter. Investors comparing today’s price with the pre-offering chart must adjust for the new share count; an unchanged share price now represents a much larger equity valuation.

The company also had an at-the-market program allowing up to $11.95 million of sales, although no shares were sold under it during Q1. The May prospectus stated that the ATM was suspended unless and until Artiva filed a new prospectus supplement. Given the large financing, near-term dependence on the ATM is low. Over a multi-year horizon, additional dilution through equity compensation, strategic financing or future offerings remains possible, especially if Phase 3 costs rise or the company expands multiple autoimmune programs simultaneously.

9. Ownership, insider activity and management: specialist conviction is unusually visible

ARTV has a concentrated specialist ownership structure. This can provide a patient capital base, but it can also amplify volatility because a large portion of the equity is held by a relatively small number of sophisticated owners and strategic affiliates.

RA Capital: offering participation plus post-EULAR open-market buying

RA Capital’s involvement is one of the clearest ownership signals. In the May offering, the group acquired 6,510,416 shares at $11.52, an investment of approximately $75 million. That purchase was part of a negotiated underwritten financing and should be distinguished from an open-market transaction.

After the June 8 EULAR and RMAT update, RA Capital bought another 1,027,722 shares on the open market: 479,039 shares on June 9 at a weighted-average $6.91, 103 shares on June 10 at $7.00 and 548,580 shares on June 11 at a weighted-average $7.91. The disclosed cost was approximately $7.65 million. The Form 4 shows the group as a director-affiliated 10% owner and reported 16,231,717 shares in the principal fund after the transactions, plus additional positions in related funds and an account.

This is a meaningful conviction signal because the purchases occurred after the data presentation and below the offering price. It is not proof that the program will succeed. Specialist investors can be wrong, may have a longer time horizon than public shareholders and can manage risk across a portfolio in ways that individual investors cannot replicate.

GC Corp and GC Cell

GC Corp and GC Cell invested approximately $16.5 million in the offering through combined purchases of 1,432,291 shares at $11.52. Their role is strategically different from that of a financial sponsor: they are connected to the licensed technology, manufacturing framework and territorial development rights. The additional equity investment increases alignment, while also reinforcing the dependence of Artiva’s platform on the Korean partnership.

Leadership changes in 2026

Fred Aslan, M.D., remains chief executive officer. In May 2026, Artiva appointed Diego Miralles, M.D., as president and head of research and development. Miralles brings senior drug-development experience at an important transition point: the company is moving from small basket studies into a global registrational program. Thad Huston joined as chief financial officer in February 2026, strengthening the capital-markets and financial-execution function before the large May raise.

The management test is now operational rather than promotional. The team must translate an attractive early dataset into a consistent protocol, manufacture and supply product for more than 80 sites, coordinate regulators, protect the safety profile and control spending over a two-year enrollment and follow-up period. A strong scientific story will not compensate for a late or poorly executed Phase 3 trial.

10. Competitive landscape: AlloNK is competing with the entire immune-reset field, not only other NK companies

Artiva’s competition can be divided into three layers. The first is the existing RA standard of care: TNF inhibitors, other biologics, JAK inhibitors and rituximab. These therapies are widely understood, commercially available and easier to prescribe than cell therapy. Artiva is targeting a difficult-to-treat subset in which multiple classes have failed, but any new regimen must still justify conditioning, logistics and cost against another cycle of established therapy.

The second layer is autologous CD19-directed CAR-T. Several biotechnology companies are studying CAR-T immune reset across rheumatologic diseases. Autologous products may offer deep and durable depletion, but they require individualized manufacturing and often involve more intensive care pathways. Artiva’s differentiation thesis is that an allogeneic NK product could deliver meaningful immune reset with faster availability, lower acute toxicity and outpatient administration.

The third layer is other off-the-shelf cell therapies and next-generation B-cell-depleting approaches, including allogeneic CAR-T, engineered NK cells, bispecific antibodies and alternative combinations designed to reach tissue-resident or treatment-resistant B-cell compartments. The competitive bar may change before Artiva reports Phase 3 data in 2028. A program that looks highly differentiated in 2026 could face more convenient or more effective alternatives by the time it approaches filing.

Cross-trial headlines should be treated cautiously. Artiva’s EULAR abstract used language describing responses as comparable with autologous CAR-T, but the company’s own risk disclosure warns that differences in trial design, patient characteristics, pooling and follow-up make separate datasets inherently limited and not directly comparable. The randomized Phase 3 study is designed to answer a narrower and more defensible question: does adding AlloNK to rituximab materially improve six-month ACR50 response in refractory RA?

11. Catalyst Calendar: the next phase is execution-heavy rather than headline-heavy

Nearer-term items that are not formal clinical catalysts

• Post-financing quarterly results: the next filing should clarify cash, spending and the cost of Phase 3 preparation. An exact reporting date should not be assumed until the company announces it.
• Clinical-trial registration: a public Phase 3 record can provide enrollment criteria, endpoint details, geography and estimated timelines.
• Manufacturing and supply disclosure: investors should watch for evidence that product release, cold-chain logistics and capacity are ready for more than 80 sites.
• Additional disease data: Sjögren, systemic sclerosis or myositis updates could add platform value, but management must avoid distracting capital from the RA registrational program.
• Partnership activity: a regional or indication-specific partnership could validate the platform and reduce spending, but no such transaction should be assumed.

12. Bull case, bear case and the decision hinge

The decision hinge

The entire ARTV thesis can be reduced to one question: can AlloNK add a large, durable and clinically meaningful benefit over rituximab alone without losing the outpatient safety and operational advantages that justify using cell therapy in rheumatoid arthritis?

Everything else—RMAT, institutional purchases, the Korean partnership, cash runway and platform optionality—improves the probability that Artiva can run the experiment. None of it answers the experiment.

What would strengthen the thesis before the 2028 readout

• Phase 3 initiation within the stated H2 2026 window.
• Clear evidence of rapid site activation and sustained enrollment.
• Longer follow-up showing continued response without new targeted therapy or high-dose steroids.
• A stable safety profile as the autoimmune database expands beyond 100 and then 250 patients.
• Manufacturing and logistics evidence supporting consistent treatment across community sites.
• Additional controlled or well-characterized data showing that benefit is not driven by patient selection.
• Disciplined spending that preserves the 2029 runway despite Phase 3 growth.

What would damage or falsify the thesis

• A material delay in Phase 3 launch without a clear, reversible explanation.
• Loss of response or high retreatment needs during longer follow-up.
• Serious infection, prolonged cytopenia or other toxicity inconsistent with community use.
• Regulatory changes requiring a much larger or second registrational study.
• CMC or manufacturing constraints that limit site expansion or create product variability.
• Rituximab-alone performance close to the AlloNK combination in randomized data.
• A spending trajectory that materially shortens the stated runway before the pivotal readout.

13. Valuation framework: cash matters, but the market is underwriting a binary asset

Traditional earnings multiples are not useful for Artiva. The company has no commercial revenue and is expected to remain loss-making throughout Phase 3. A more relevant framework separates three components: net cash, the risk-adjusted value of AlloNK in refractory RA and limited option value for the broader platform.

The May prospectus reported as-adjusted net tangible book value of approximately $368.4 million immediately after the financing, equivalent to $7.26 per share under the filing’s assumptions. That number provides a useful historical reference but is not a liquidation value and is not the current balance sheet. Clinical spending will reduce cash, liabilities and commitments matter, and a failed lead program could cause the company to trade below cash because investors would anticipate future burn and restructuring costs.

Conversely, a successful Phase 3 program would not be valued only on cash. Artiva estimates that 150,000 to 200,000 U.S. patients have failed at least two b/tsDMARD classes and describes a large pool of spending on patients with low odds of achieving ACR50 on available therapies. Those are company estimates, not guaranteed commercial demand. Adoption would depend on label, durability, conditioning burden, safety, treatment capacity, reimbursement and competition.

14. Retail sentiment and trading structure

ARTV attracts catalyst-focused biotech traders because the stock combines specialist ownership, an unusually visible regulatory path and a float that is smaller than the total basic share count suggests. MarketWatch reported approximately 48.59 million shares outstanding and a public float near 30.47 million in early July, although third-party float and short-interest figures should always be checked against their calculation dates.

Social-media discussion tends to emphasize the 71% ACR50 rate, RMAT designation, the $11.52 offering price and RA Capital’s purchases. Those points are real, but trader commentary is not clinical validation. The most common analytical error is to compare the current stock price directly with the offering price without accounting for time horizon, portfolio strategy and the fact that institutional investors may accept large interim volatility.

Another error is to treat the large cash balance as a guaranteed floor. Biotechnology companies can trade below cash when a lead program fails or when burn is expected to consume the balance. Cash is valuable because it gives Artiva the ability to reach the pivotal answer; it does not predetermine the answer.

16. Primary Sources and Verification Links

• Artiva Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March 31, 2026 — financials, trial strategy, GC Cell agreements, pipeline, share awards and risk factors.
• Artiva Form 8-K filed May 8, 2026 — initial autoimmune efficacy, safety, B-cell depletion and FDA alignment.
• May 2026 prospectus supplement — $300 million offering, net proceeds, use of funds and post-offering capitalization.
• Artiva June 8, 2026 company release distributed by GlobeNewswire — EULAR dataset and RMAT announcement.
• FDA: Regenerative Medicine Advanced Therapy designation — official eligibility criteria and regulatory context.
• RA Capital Form 4 filed June 11, 2026 — verified post-EULAR open-market purchases.
• GC Corp and GC Cell Form 4 filed May 28, 2026 — strategic ownership and offering purchases.
• Artiva investor-relations news archive — official company updates and event announcements.
• Merlintrader Biotech Catalyst Calendar — broader regulatory and clinical-event tracking.